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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JA~IES

SDR-4-UES and \TIRGINIA

Z~\:JJBUKOS,

PZaintijfs and Respondents,
Case No.

Vl!l.

80031

S_.AJ.I RONDO'S,
Defendant ·and AppelZan.t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT'S

I
STATEMENT
This action was commenced by respondents to enjoin the appellant from' trespassing upon property owned
by respondents, and for damages resulting therefrom.
Upon respondents' motion the damage action was dismissed.
Appellant's pleading, until the day of trial, con-
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sisted of a general denial of the allegations of respondents' complaint. At the trial, an amended answer and
counterclaim was filed, wherein appellant sought to establish a right-of-way over all of respondents' land not
occupied by buildings. The trial court held that appellant had not ·established ~such right-of-way.
Respondents' buildings consist of structures on the
Southeast Corner of Second South and West Temple
Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. They own a frontage of
125 f~et on Second South Street and of 128Yz feet on
West Temple Street. The buildings are occupied by retail stores. The wall of a building, owned by third parties, is erected on the 'South line of respondents' property, and extends from the West Temple Street sidewalk line to the East, approximately 76 feet. This structure, together with the Southern structure of respondents' building, forms an alley-way extending from West
Temple Street Eastward for 76 feet, into an area-way
approximately 90 feet square. In this 90-foot area are
thrre·e on·e-story structures, two of which consist of extensions to respondents' and appellant's buildings, which
face on S'econd South Street, and the third is a double
garage owned by respondents, and located to the rear of
appellant's premises. Access to this rear area, above referred to, could be and was had from three sides, the
West, South, and East.
There is no pleading on the part of app·ellant to the
effect that he claims a 12 x 165 foot right-of-way to the
rear of his premises. Nor is there any pleading, or any
p~roof, as to the extent of the burden of such purported
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right-of-\Yay. Nor ran the extent of such use, or claim~ed
n~t"}. be detern1ined from a reading of appellant's brief.
The testin1ony offered to establish such right-ofway "~as giYen through two elderly gentlemen, Richard
C. Latimer and A. F. Gotberg. A fair statement of their
testimony is as follows :

LA.\.Tll\IER TESTIMONY
This ,,-i tness testified that he had· been connected
with the operation of the property owned by ap-pellant
for practically all his life, and, insofar as there was a
manager, he managed it (Tr. 129, 132). On direct examination, he stated that coal had been brought to these
premises from West Temple Street over the 76 foot
right-of-way at irregular periods. On cross-examination,
he stated positivr.ely that he had never seen coal delivered
to appellant's premises in his life (Tr. 143).
This 'ntness testified, futher, that he had never
discussed a right-of-,yay with respondents, their predecessor in title, or any one else during his life, and that
he had never claimed a right-of-way (Tr. 13.6, 146, 147).
He had frequently seen respondents and their predecessors in title and talked with them.
Mr. Latimer also testified that aoccess to the rear
of his premises was obtained both from the South and
from the East (Tr. 145, 146). He also testified that he
had never seen an~~ of the work being actually done on
his building, except for some bricks which were stored
on his premises. H·e also testified that his building had
been leased ~to Jim Latsis from the early 1920's until
1938 and from 1939 or 1940 it was leas~ed to Mr. La:tsis

'
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and Mr. Sdrales and Bob Latsis, the nephew of Jim Latsis. In this connection, it will be noted that Mr. Latsis
and Mr. Sdrales owned re'Spondents' premises. from 1939
until the presen't time.
He further testified that a party by the name of
Jack Moore rented his pren1ises for app·roximately a
year, and that Mr. Moore tried to p~ark his car at the rear
of the premises, but was forced to move.

GOTBERG TESTIMONY
This witness testified that a fence was built on appellant's property along the South line, where it joined
the North line of respondents' property, and that, by
reason of the position of the garage and this fence, considerable difficulty was encountered when coal was delivered over this fence to the stoker (Tr. 1'53, 154, 157,
164). H·e testified tha:t from 1893 to 1930, practically all
traffic, except the delivery of coal, came from the rightof-way to the South, and not the 12 x 76 foot right-ofway to the West, and that he'd seen coal delivered "quite
often'' over this period.
Tr. 161 and 162:''Q Before 1933 and for, 'Say from 1893, when you
went there until 1930, this was all open for
traffic in through here, wasn't it~
A

Yes, all of it. They offered me to let me park
my car, when I first got one, for fifty cents a
week.

Q

But there was considerable 'traffic behind
these buildings all around through here· and

~

around~
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. .\nd thi~ beaut~,. parlor, n fter they come in
there they took in big car loads of stuff. They
come eYer~· three or four da~'s and filled up
their "~hole basement. At first thev were in
the Block. and they bought a building on the
north of that and then I heard there was
son1e objection about using the alleyway,
when they "'ere going to put up· a gate or
something.

Q

There 'Yas just as much traffic, or I should
say there "'"as more traffic came from up
here than through here to service the Eagle
block, wasn't there?

. ..\.

Yes. sure. This business was only really for
coal. That w. as about the only business it was
used for for the first thirty-five years I was
up there.

Q

And the coal could have be·en delivered here
just as easy as here?

A

It could have but it never was. They always
come in this way.

He also testified that some coal was delivered for
use in his tailor shop, but this had been discontinued
since about 1900.
This witness did not testify that all the coal used
in appellant's building was delivered over the 12 x 76
foot entrance to the area-way. He stated he saw coal
delivered ''quite often'' since 1893. This witness testified to all sorts of miscellaneous use, but the period of
such use was since 1930, and, therefore, not within a
prescriptive period.
It is upon this testimony that appellant seeks to
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establish a right-of-way. It can be s·een from the above
s~tatement that it varies considerably, and to such an extent, that no useful purpose would he served by indicating to this court wherein the statement of facts appearing in appellant's brief differ from the record.
The only use by appellant's predecessor in title,
over a prescriptive period, appears ·to be the induction
of coal to appellant's stoker for some length of time, as
testified to by Mr. Gotberg, who, on cross-examination,
testified that all the traffic to the rear of these buildings
came from the South, over what he described as the
"Cullen right-of-way" (see above excerpt from transcript) except for some coal deliveries, for the period
from 189'3 to 1930.
Mr. Gotberg also testi~ied tha:t the garages located
on respondents' premises had been there since coal was
delivered, and that the garages, so situated, w·er,e in use
during the period.
It is undisputed that the garage was owned and occupied by respondents, and their predecessors in title,
and used by them since their erection, and that all the
area-way had been us·ed by respondents themselves, or
the use of such area-way was permitted for their tenants.
There is a door, located at the rear of ap·pellant's
premises, and to the East of the one-story brick structure, and, in view of Mr. Gotberg's testimony that a
fence existed on th:e rear line of appellant's property,
it would affirmatively appear from the position of this
door that access, for some years, to the rear of appellant's premises had been main~tained to the East, where
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Mr. Uotberg HIHl ~lr. La.tin1~r testified an open field
existed for the greater part of the period involved. Appell~ts stipulate there \Yas areess to the east (Tr. 193,
194).
Ko claim is Inade that appellant used the area-way
at the south of his pren1is-es to the exclusion of every one
else including respondents. It is agreed that this a~ea
"\Yas used by respondents, their predecessors in interest,
together "ith their tenants and licensees. It appears further that the respondent's garages were used as such
for many years.
II
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER RESPONDENTS LAND.

T4e physical condition, existing ~t the rear of appellant's premises, sho,vs a coal stoker on the Southeast Corner. A double garage is located 3 feet South of
appellant's premises, and extends to the West. A onestory brick building extends from the South ·side of appellant's main building to within a few feet of appellant's South boundary. The EaS't line of ~the one-story
brick building is due North and South of the West line
of the tin garage (see exhibit "A"). The distance between the Southeast Corner of the one-story brick
building and the Northwest Corner of the tin garage
has varied from a little over 3 feet to almost 8 or 9
feet, since the existence of these buildings. Any coal delivered must have been carried ov·er the fence or moved
hy means of a chute, approximately 20 feet from the corner points of these buildings to the stoker. The placing
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of the stoker in its position indicates that coal was delivered from the East side, where access has been available for the full period of its existence.
It also seems very peculiar that from 1893 to 1930
all traffic should come from the South, except coal delive.ries. It seems almost unbelievable that a vehicle,
usually a team of horses, carrying a bulky commodity,
'Such as coal, would prefer to back for a distance of
approximately 150 feet from West Temple Street, as testified by Mr. Gotherg, rather than enter by pulling a
load forward from the South, and turn around in the
area-way.
The trial court was present when this testimony was
given, and was inclined to disregard this phenomenon.
The trial court, also, had an opportunity to view these
witness·es and the manner in which their testimony was
given, in determining the facts concerning the delivery
of coal.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that the
evidenee of any use of the 12 x 7·6 foot ·entrance by ap~
pellant is highly unsatisfactory, and far from the positive proof thereof required to establish an .easement in
a down-town area, where prop,erty values are the highest. And, that such evidence is wholly insufficient to
sustain a finding of an easemen'.t by the trial court.
Appellant has not pleaded a 12 x 165 foot right-ofway, nor does th·e evidence show such use·. In other words,
he asks the court to delineate an estate in respondents'
property, without pleading 'the sam·e, or without proving

it.
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There is no t~vidence whatsoever of the use claimed.
There is no pleading to support a finding of the burden
imposed on respondents' land, by way of easement, nor
is there ·even a definitive statemnt in appellant's brief
as to the extent of such use. Notwithstanding the absence
of these factors, appellant asks this court to determine
the physical limits of a right-of-way, together with the
use per1nitted on such right-of-way, after its limits are
established by the court. This procedure is unheard of.
In order to establish a prescriptive ·easement, there
must be a use thereof, under a claim ·of .riglii The evidence as to an~~ claim of right, as given by Mr. Latimer,
is as follows :
1

•

Direct examination, Tr. 136 :-

' •Q

. ._;\_

Let us start from the time you started the
managing of this prop·erty for the Latimer
heirs. Have you ever had occasion to· discuss
the us·e of this right-of-way with anyone~
No, I haven't."

Cross examinatio-n, Tr. 146:-

,' Q But for 15 or 20 years there was another entrance cut in

there~

A

Yes.

Q

The question of your using this right-of-way,
using, you say, 1Ir. Latimer, and I ?elieve
you're right, in this, that the question of
these people in this part using this ·entrance
to get to the back of the premis·es has never
been discussed by you at all, has it~

A

I never had any trouble with anybody about
it.
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Q
A

And it ha'S never been even talked of, has it 1
No.
Q Do you r~em·ember Mr. Ball, who ran the
Eagle Block, these s'tores, did you know him 1
A Yes.
Q And you know Mr. Ball, who is still alive
now~

A

Yes, I know him.

Q

And he is not too young now and his father
before him ran it, did he not~

A

Yes, I think so.

Q All these other interests, and it is my information, and I think it is a fact, is it not, you
never had any discussion with those people
about it1

A

That is right.

Q

You were 'there frequently with them~

A Yes."
Cross examination, Tr. 147:' 'Q Your relations with Mr. Sdrales and Mr.
L.atses have always been friendly and neighborly while you have be·en there 1
A

Yes, sir.''

It is the further re-collection of counS'el for respondents, and the trial court, that Mr. Latimer expressly
testified th~t he claimed no right-of-way as. against
r·espondents.
It should be noted that Mr. Latimer t,estified that he
had not discussed his right-of-way with OIYV!JOne, so he
must not have claim~ed it.
\

~
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In addition to the objection that no claim of right
was ever n1ade, there is absolutely no testimony to the
effect that any use "~hatsoever was adverse to the rights
of respondents.
There exists also a further reason why no prescriptive right W'"as obtained by app·ellant. Respondents aequired their property in 193.9, and since that time, the
evidence of Mr. Latimer affirmatively shows that respondents, or the nephe\Y of the Latsis interest, leased the
building of appellant. The use, if any, of the Latsis interest, while they were the owners of the servient estate, is conclusively presumed to be p·ermissive, and not
adverse. Therefore, for the period from 1939 to the date
of trial, the use "~as clearly permissive, and this period
cannot be considered in determining a prescriptive right.
The rule of la\v sought to be invoked by appellant is
that wh·ere a use of a way has been open, notorious, and
con'tinuous, under a claim of right, for a p·eriod of 20
years, a presump~tion of grant arises, and the use made
of the servient tenement is, th·erehy, established.
In this cas·e, however. there is no claim of right, ·nor
was the use continuous to the time of trial, nor was any
particular use established. Therefore, th·e authorities
cited by app·ellant, do not apply.
In support of respondents' contention that a prescriptive right must be pleaded and proved, the court
is referred to the case of Farr v. Wheelwright Construction C~o., 163 P. 25·6, 49 Utah 274, and to the case of B-ertolin-a v. F 11ates, 57 P. (2) 346, 89 Utah 238. In the latter
case, the court, in citing the fonner case, says:
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''As pointed out by Mr. Justice Frick in F(}Jf'r
v. Whe,elwright Const'ruc-b:ion Co., 49 Utah 274,
16:-3 P. 2·56, 257 : 'It should require no argument,
howev·er, to show that where one claims an easeInent over real ·property he should set forth his
claim in apt terms in his pleading'.''
The 'two above cases hold squarely that to obtain
a prescriptive easement there must be a use adverse
and under a claim of right. The eourt, in Fiarr v. Whe,elwrigh.t Construction Co., sup·ra, says.
"Appellant's counsel, however, also insists
that the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to constitute adverse user. By again referring to the allegations of the complaint hereinbefore set forth it will be seen that it is not alleged that the alleged use was adverse and under
a claim of right. This court, in common with many
other courts, has frequently held that in order to
acquire an eas·ement or right-of-way over real estate in this state by user, such user must be continuous for a period of 20 years; must be adverse
to the true owner, and under a claim of right.
Lwnd v. Wiloox, 34 Utah 205, 97 Pac. 33; Harkness v. WoodmatnSe.e, 7 Utah 227, 26 Pac. 291;
Funk v. Andersorn, 22 Utah 238, 61 Pac. 1006.
Respondents' counsel S'eeks to distinguish this
case from the cases ·we have just cited, but there
is no distinction in principle.
In 1 Elliott, Roads and Stre·ets (3d Ed.) :sec.
194, in speaking of what is sufficient to constitute an ~easement by user, ~the author says:
'We have already shown thltt; the use, must
he under claim of right. Where the· use is merely permissive and not adverse, there is no basis
on which a right of way by prescription can
rest'.''
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This court re-affir1ns the above rule in Bertolima v.
Fra.te~, ~nprn, in the following~ language:
~~\\~here a person claims to have acquired an
ease1nent by prescription over another's land, he
n1u~t ~how that he has acquired it by his own
continuous~ open, uninteTrupted, and adverse user
under clain1 of right for the twenty-year prescrip·tive period. The p·rescriptive right is based originally llpon the 'theory of a grant implied from
long US'er. Funk v. An.aerson, 22 Utah 2:38, ·61 P.
1006."

This court has also considered the claim of right
necessary to establish an easement in Dahl v. Roach, 76
Utah 74, 287 P. 622, where this court held that the
claim to a right-of-way must be made known to · th·e
owners of the s-ervient estate. This was an action by
plaintiff to establish a right-of-way over premise'S by
defendant. The trial court ·entered judgment in favor of
defendant~ and plaintiff appealed. The court found that
the appeal failed, because:
"(1)

The testimony is not conclusiv·e of any
open, adverse, continuous, uninterrupted,
and exclusive use of the way with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the owner
of the servient estate, and

(2)

It appears withthout dispute that during at
least seven of .the years necessary to create a prescriptive right the plaintiff occupied the premises as a tenant of the
owner."

As to the requisite for establishing a ·prescriptive· rightof-way, the court said:
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"The first headnote to Tarpey v. Heath, 22
Cal. App 289, 134 P. 3.67, is: 'A right of w~ay
claimed by a prescrip~tion wa:s not es~ablished
without showing that the use w~as adverse, 0!1Ul
under claim of right communicated to t·he !OWner,
or was so continuous, openly and notoriously adverse as to create the presumption of knowledge.'
''Among other cases ci;ted to the same effect are: Crosier v. Br~own, 66 W. Va. 273, 66 S.
E. 326, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 174; Gardner v. Swi(Jmm,
114 Ga. 304,40 S. E. 271; SchuZenbarger v. Johtnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 843, 35 L.R.A. (N;S.)
941; Watson v. Board of County Com'rs., 38
Wash. 662, 80 P. 201.
''Plaintiff makes no claim that the owner of
the servient ·estate was ever notified that plaintiff claimed a right to travel over or use the way
in controversy. Nothing was ever s1aid ~at OJYIIY time
t~o t'he ow·we.r of the servtient estate that plaintiff
did claim such a right. The evidence on behalf of
defendants is to the effect that no right was ever
granted to plaintiff to us·e· such way for any purpose whatever. Moreo:ver·, the pToof by plaintiff's
own wi'tness, of the use by plaintiff of defendant
Jeremy's land, does not show that in driving
cattle to or oveT said premises, or in driving
wagons or other vehicles thereover, they were
confined to any particular strip or portion of
Jeremy's land. In fact, the testimony fails to show
a continuous and ~exclusive use of the right of
way not only for 'the prescriptive period, but for
any length of time whatever.''
The California decisions hold to the same effect,
and, as to the rule invoked in the factual situation existing in this case, see Smith v. Skrbeck, 162 P. (2) 674.
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This ''"as an aetion by· plaintiff against defendant to establish a right-of-way by prescription. Defendant crosscomplained to quiet title to their property free and
clear of the alleged right-of-way. From a judgment for
defendants, plaintiff appealed. As to the proof nece"S'Sary
to establish a right-of-way, the court said:
'' ",..e 1nay assum·e from testimony adduced by
plaintiff that she and her husband used the road,yay ""'henever they had occasion to tr·avel that
way: but such use is insufficient to establish a
prescriptive title, unless there is evidence that
such use was made for the prescriptive p·eriod,
under claim of right made known to, -or asserted
in. such manner as t·o make known 't:o, the titular
owner a knowledge of the asserted claim. There
is no evidence that plaintiff -ever ·asserted any
such claim to the previous owner, defendants'
grantor, or that her occasional use of the road
was not with his permission and a a neighborly
accommodation. W·e cannot assume, in the absence of ·evidence, that the prior owner had knowledge, either actual or constructive, that plaintiff's use was hostile or adverse."
and further:
''The right to the us-e of a roadway over
another man's land may be acquired by grant or
by prescription. A prescriptive right to a roadway may he secured only by clear evidence of adverse use, openly, notoriously and continuously
ass-erted for a p·eriod of five years or more. The
cZaim of right must be commu.nioat-ed to the owner
of the land, or the use of the roadway must he so
obvious as to constitute implied notice of the adverse claim. The burden is on one who claim-s a
prescriptive right to use a private roadway to
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affirmativ·ely prov·e the essential elements thereof. O~arke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667, 66 P. 10; Grimmesey v. Kirtlan, 93 Cal. App. 658, 270 P. 243; 1
Cal. Jur. 608, sec. 81; 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, p. 558, sec. 45. ~'
The san1e rule was applied in the California case
of ·D01oling v. Dabel, 186 P. (2') 183, (California 1947).
In this case, the court held that using the land of another
for several years, without protest from the owner, does
not establish an easement. The court said:
''We are of the opinion ·the findings and judgm·ent are adequately supported by the evidence.
A prescriptive right to an easement in a roadway over the real property of another person
may he acquired only by clear evidence of adv·ers·e use, openly, notoriously and continuously
asserted for the statutory period of five years.
The claim of right must be communicated to the
owner of the land, ·or the use of the roadway must
be so obviously exercised as to constitute an implied notice of the adverse claim.''
The Supreme Court of Arizona had this same problem before it in LaRue v. KO'sich, 187 P. (2) 642. In this
ca:s·e, no claim to a right-of-way was ever made by the
p·ersons claiming it to those persons owning ·the servient
tenement. On this phase of the case, the court said:
' ' Again, in the same cas·e the court further
said: 'The defendant and his tenants were in the
habit of passing over the unenclosed strip of
land when going to o~ from their business. The
question as to whe!ther or not the use was under
a claim of right, or a mer·e matter of neighborly
accommodation, was a question of fact to be de-
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termined by the court in the light of the relations.
of the parties, their conduct, the situation of the
property, and all the surrounding circumstances.
The court below saw the witnesses, heard them
testify, and found the facts against the defendant.
Defendant testified that he used the way and
claimed the right to use it, but it does not appear
that any such claim was ever made to plaintiff
or to his grantor. It is not sufficient that the claim
of right exists only in the mind of the person
claiming it. It muSit in some way be assert·ed in
such manner that the owne.r may know :of the
cla.int.. The fact that the owner knew of the travel
and occasional us·e of the property does not ever
rais-e a pr·esumption that such use was hostile or
under claim of right. If any p~arty who is allowed
by silent permission to pass over the lands of
another, nothing being said as to any right being
claimed, after five years, without showing that
he ·ever communicated such claim in any way to
the owner, can thus gain title by pre'Scription, it
would be a blot upon the law. An owner could not
allow his neighbor to pass and repass over !1
trail, upon his open, unenclosed land, without
danger of having an adverse title successfully set
up against him. If he had sev·eral neighbo;rs who
so used the land, several separate titles to right
of way might thus be acquired. The law will pre·sume that the land belongs to the own·er of th·e
paper title, and tha:t the use was by permission
or silent acquiescence. If this presump~tion is
overcome by evidence showing the use to have
been hostile, and that the owner knew of such
hostile claim and took no steps to protect his property for a period of five years, then the pre·Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sumption changes.' (Emphasis supplied.) ''
"F,rom his testimony, it will be noted that
plaintiff used the way and claimed a right to use
it but it does not appear that any such claim was
·ever made to the defendant or to his grantor
prior to the building of the fence.''
Mr. Latimer testified that he had never seen coal
delivered, and had neV~er made a claim to a right-ofway here involved. Mr. Gotberg, as indicated in ap·pellant 's brief on page 21, testified that ·he had seen a coal
truck com·e over the purported right-of-way ''quite often." No case has ever held that a right-of-way could be
established on such testimony.
Appellant here tries to sustain the position that
his use of the premis,es was "notorious" and "continuous,'' yet Mr. Latimer, the owner for most of the period,
has never seen a coal truck come in on the right-of-way,
which is an instance of the claimed us~e.
If the appellant is to prevail in this case, the court,
upon its own motion~ will be required to define the physical limits of a right-of-way, and to ·establish, with certainty, the use to which such right-of-way can be put by
appellant. And, this use must include what type of vehicle can use such right-of-way, and on what occasions,
in order that respondents can restrict any excessive use
over that so established.

It is submitted that no evidence on eith·er of the
above propositions is contained in this record on appeaL
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III
NO PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT ARISES, BECAUSE THE UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE IS THAT THE LAND SOU,GHT TO BE SUBJECTED BY APPELLANT TO A PRESCRIPTIVE
RIGHT, WAS USED IN COMMO·N WITH RESPONDENTS.

The land owned by appellant and respondents was
never in a common grantor, so no question of implie·d
or reserved easement is involved in this case at all. Nor
is there any question of an easem·e,nt arising from necessity.
Respondents, in pointing out that the rear of appellant's premises was accessible from other direction,
did so only to show that there was no use of the particular ground, as claimed by appellant.
The evidence, on behalf of all parties, shows conclusively that the rear area-way was used by a number
of people, and, perhaps, by the public. The 12 x 16'5 foot
area, claimed by appellant in his brief as a right-of-way,
extends from West Temple Street in a straight line to
respondents' garages, and thes-e garages, it is un·disputed, were continually in use, as was th~e 12-foot extension of the alley-way.
An examination of respondents' EXhibit'' A'' clearly shows the relative position of the respondents' garages and the South prop~erty line of appellant's land.
Any use of these garages requires traffic over the strip
claimed by appellant as a right-of-way.
From this exhibit, it can be s·een tha:t any use of this
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area-way by respondents, in servicing the rear of their
buildings, necessarily requires th_e use of the greater portion of the right-of-way now claim-ed by appellant.
These facts stand undisputed, as does, the fact that
the ar·ea-way was used by respondents, and their predecessors in title. Ther·efore, if there was any use of this
area by appellant, or his predecessors, it was in common with owners of respondents' p·r~emis·es. This factual
situation is the deeisive feature of this case.
Assuming appellant had proved a sufficient use of
the premises, his right to an ·easement depends entirely
on favorable presumptions of law with regard to all
the necessary elements, because there ·exists no express
grant of this estate to him. How·ever, no such presumptions arise under the facts in this case, because the land
sought to be impressed with an easement was used in
common with the owner.
The law is well-established that, when one constructs, maintains, or us·e·s a right-of-way on his own
land, and his neighbor, or some adjacent property owp.er,
uses the same area, that no pr•esumption of adverse use
aris~s, but that a presumption of permissive us·e arise'S.
A permissive use, for no matt·er how long, cannot ripen
int:o an easement.
This doctrine has been maintained by this court
since the case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227,
26 P. 291, wher·e the court stated the rule to be:
''Where a person opens a way for the use of
his own premises, and another person uses it also
without causing damage, the presump'tion IS, in
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the absenre of eYidence to the contrary, that such
use by the latter was permissive, and not under
a clain1 of right. W a~hb. Easem. 151.''
This rule '""as re-affirm·ed in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85
Utah 4-81~ 39 P. (2) 1070, where the court says:
''A twenty-year use alone of a way is not suf. .
ficient to establish an easement. M·ere use of a
road,vay opened by a landowner for his own purpos-es will be presum-ed permissive. An antagonistic or adverse use of a way cannot spring from
a permissive use. A prescriptive title must be
acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse when it
rests upon a license or mere neighborly accommodation. Adverse user is the antithesis of permissive user. If the use is accompanied by any
recognition in express terms or by implica:tion of
a right in the landowner to stop such us·e now
or at some time in the future, the use is not adv·erse.''
In the recent case of Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah
514, 175 P. (2) 714, cited by appellant, th·e rule is recognized in the following language:
''It is contended that the road and the gate
in the fence at the west: terminus of the road w•ere
opened for and used by the landowner and that
Zollinger's use of the road did not injure the land
and did not int·erfere with the landowneT's use of
same and therefore his use was p·ermissive and
under the landowner. In the early case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291, 293,
this court recogniz·ed the p·rinciple ·as follows:
'Where a person opens a way for the use of his
own premises, and another person uses. it also
without causing ·damage, the presumption is, in
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the absenee of evidence to the contrary, that such
by the latter was permissive, and not under
claim of right'.''

us~e

The question is annotated in 170 A.L.R. page 825,
where the rule is stated as follows :
''Where the way in ques'tion is shown to have
been opened or maintained by the owner of the
soil for his own benefit, and the claimant's use of
it appears to have been merely in common with
him, no presumption arises that the latter's use
of it was adverse or under a ·claim of right. In
the absence of addiitonal circumstances p~ertain
ing to the origin or nature of the claimant's use,
and expressing a purpose to impos·e a separate
servitude upon the land, the use is presumed to
be permissiv~e only."
Numerous cases are cited in this note.
In 19 C. J. at page 898, the rule is stated thus:
''Section 7·5.
USE BY OWNER FO·R
HIS 0·\VN PURPOSES. Wher~e a landowner
opens up a way on his own land for his own use
and convenience, the mere use thereof by another,
under circumstances which do not injure the road
nor int~erfere with the owner's use of it, will not
in the absence of circumstances indicating a claim
of right be considered as adverse, and will not
ripen into a prescriptive right no matter how
long continued. Where ·a sp,ace is left open by the
.owner for his own convenience the presurrnptiofflt
ordin,arily is that the use of such space by atno,tlter, ev·en for his ·own purtp,ose, is permissive.
Nevertheless, it has been held that the mer~e fact
that a way has been established by the owner of
the land for his own use does not of itself prevent
a user of the way by ano'ther from becoming ad-
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verse. But in order to acquire this charact,er
kno"rledge must be brought home to the owner
of th~e land that the user is claimed .as of right.
The requirement is not satisfied by keeping the
road in repair for the us·e of both parties, or by
constructing and maintaining bridges on it. And
it has been held that the fact that a 't:enant of one
claiming an easement in a right of way by adv.erse
user had complained, on one occasion, that poles
,,~hich had been piled on the way obstructed it,
and that the agent of the owner remo¥ed the
san1e, \Yas not evidence of an assertion of right to
use the way sufficient to rip·en into title by adverse us~er. ''
·
The texts cited above are amply supported in many
recent decisions, among which are the following:
Smith v · Skrbek, 162 P. ( 2) 67 4, (California 1945).
The evidence in this case was that the defendant constructed the road for his own use, and that, thereafter,
plaintiff used it with defendant, as a common means
of access. ''Then this condition exists, the court, quoting
Jensen v. Gerrard, 39 P. (2) 1070, (Utah), said:
"It is a reasonable presumption that since
the roadway was constructed by the defendants'
predecessor in title, upon his own land, for his
personal benefit, as a means of aceess from the
public highway to his dwelling h~ouse and farm
buildings, that the plaintiff's use of the road was
merely perimssive, as a neighborly convenience.
Jensen v. Ger~ard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070;
28 C-.J.S., Eeasements, p. 668, sec. 18(2). In the
text last cited it is said : 'Wher;e a landowner
opens up a way on his own land for his own use
and convenience, th~e me:ve use thereof by another,
under circumstances which do not injure the road
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nor interfere with the owner's use of it, will not
in the abs·ence of circumstances indicating a claim
of right be considered as adverse, and will not
rip~en into a prescriptive right no matter how long
continued.'
''In this case there is no evidence that the
plaintiff or her predecessor in title helped to construct or keep in repair the roadway over defendants' land. No actual notice of her claim of
prescriptive . right to tra:vel ~the·. road was ever
given. Although the de£endants talked with her
about their title to the land before they purchased
the· ranch in November, 1941, and again while
they wer~e changing the course of the road in August, 1942, she failed to mention her claim to a
right to use the road. Plaintiff's occasional use
of the road for a short distance of less than a
hundr'ed feet from the highway to her garage and
gate did not interfere in the least with defendant's use thereof.''
The late·r California cas'e of Do'o,ling v. Dabel, 186
P. (2) 183, (California 1947), affirms this rule in the
following language :
" 'It is a reasonable presumption that since
the roadway was constructed by the defendants'
predecessor in title, upon his own land, for his
personal benefit, as means of access from the
public highway to his dwelling hous~e and farm
buildings, that the plaintiff's use of the road was
m~erely permissive, as a neighborly convenience.
Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070;
28 C.J.'S., Easements, p. 668, sec. 18(2). In the
text last cited it is said :
'' 'Where a landowner opens up a way on his
own land for his own use and convenience, the
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mere use thereof by another, under circumstances
which do not injure the road nor interfere with
the O\vner 's use of it, will not in the absence of
circumstances indicating a claim of right be considered as adverse, and will not ripen into a prescriptive right no n1atter how long continued'.
The preceding declaration of laws appears to fit the
facts of this cas·e.

In LaR·ue v. Kosich, 187 P. (2) 642, (Arizona 1947),
the evidence was to the effect that the persons seeking
the easement, us·ed the premises together with the owners and others. The court held permission of the owner
·was conclusively presum·ed, in the following language·:
"'It is a recognized rule of law that wher1e
the use of a private way by a neighbor is by the
express or implied permission of the owner, the
continued use is not advers'e and cannot rip,en
into a prescriptive right. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. 0'11o-ckett, etc., Co., 70 .Cal. App. 283, 233 P. 370;
May Bernard, 40 Cal. Ap.p. 364, 180 P. 827; Irvin v. Petitfils, 44 Cal. App. 2d 496, 112 P. 2d
688. The law raises no presumption that the use
is under a claim of right. 28 C.J.S., Easements,
s·ec. 18(i); Bovullvou.n v. Consto.mtine, 186· Ark. 625,
54 S.W. 2d 986; Schudel v. H.ertz, 125 Cal. App.
564, 13 p. 2d 1008, 1186.
"Under a heading, 'Way by prescription
when use is permissive only,' it is said in 2
T·hompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) s~ec. 521:
'The modern tendency is to restrict th·e right of
one to acquire a prescriptive right of way wher~e
by another, through a mere neighborly act, may
be dep,rived of his property by its becoming vested in the one whom he favored. * * * * '
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"It is said in How,ard v. Wright, 38 Nev. 25,
143 P. 1184, 1188:
'A right of way by prescription can only
be acquired by a user which is neither expressly nor impli,edly licensed or permissive.
I~t must be adverse and hostile to the owner
of the servient estate, and mus't be under a
claim of right so expressed as to charge the
owner of the servient estate with knowledge
thereof.
'
* * * *
'Nothing less than an adverse user, under claim of legal right, will perfect an ·easement by occupancy for the statutory time.
A use acquired merely by cons~ent, permission, or indulgence of the owner of the servient estate, can never ripen into a prescri~
tive right, unless the user of the dominant
estate expressly abandons and denies his
right under licens·e or permission, and openly declares his right to he adverse to the
owner of the s-ervient estate. Hurt v. Atlams,
86 !1:o. App. 73.
·
* * * *
'The rule that precludes a permtSsvve
use from ripening int~o a .right t~o covntinue:d
·enjoyment, w~ere the permission, oonsent,
or license is expressly given is no less eff ecvive where the permission or license mruy be
implied. Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456,
12 P. ·491.' (Emphasis supplied.)
''The evidence present~ed in the cas~e at bar
conclusively shows that the plaintiff, together
with the general public, had enjoyed implied permissiv~e use of the roadway through the neighborly indulgence of its owner and his predecessors in
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interest. And, a use that has its inception in the
pennission of the owner will continu~e as such until a distinct and positive assertion of a right
hostile to the owner is brought home to him by
words or acts. Omodt v. Chicag~o, M. & 8t. P. R.y.
Co., 106 ~Iinn. 205, 118 N.W. 798; Clarke v. ·
Clarke. 133 Cal. 667, 66 P. 10: How·a.rd v. Wright,
38 Nev. 25, 143 P. 1184~ B'liarndon v. Umpqua Lbr.
& Tin1ber Co., 26 Cal. App. 96, 146 P. 46; Scheller
L'. Pierce County, 55 Wash. 298, 104 P. 277; Pitzman v. Bo,yce, 111 ~lo. 387, 19 S.W. 1104, 33 Am.
St. Rep. 536; Snlith v. Oliver, 189 Ky. 214, 2'24
S.W. 683: Smith v. Ftairfax, 180 Ky. 12, 201 S.W.
454; Fla.gg c. Phillips, 201 Mass. 216, 87 N.E. 598;
Holm v. Da.v·is, 41 Utah 200, 12·5 P. 403, 44 L.. R.A.,
N.'S.. , 89 ~ "f.....aporroa v. Weckwerth, 178 Minn. 203,
226 N.W. 569, 65 A.L.R. 124; Johnson v. Olson,
189 ~finn. 183, 248 N.W. 700; Reider v. Orme, 17
Tenn. App. 497, 68 S.W. 2d 960."
The Supreme Court of l\fontana, in White v. [(,amp's,
171 P. (2) 343, (Montana 1946), affirms this rule, and
propounds the sound reasoning underlying it, in the following language :
''In Scheller v. Pierce County, ·55 Wash. 298,
104 P. 277, 278, it was said, in quoting from Jones
on Easements, section 282:
' ''If the use of a way over one's land
is shown to be permissive only, no right to
use it is conferred, though the use may have
continued for a century or any length of
time. 'A different doctrine would haVie the
tendency to destroy all neighborhood accommodation in the way of travel; for if it were
once understood that a man, by allowing his
neighbor to pass through his farm without

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
objection, over the pass \Vay 'vhich he us·ed
himself, would thereby, after the lapse of 20
or 30 years, confer a right on him to require
the passage.wa.y to be kept open for his benefit and ·enjoyment, a prohibition against all
such travel would immediately ensue. To
create the presumption of a grant of a right
of way, the circumstances attending its us!e
must be such as to make it appear that it was
established for the benefit of the claimant,
or that its us·e was accompanied by a claim
of right, or by such acts as manifested an
intention to enjoy it, without regard to the
wishes of the owner of the land. The use
must have been enjoyed under such circumstances as will indicate that it has been claimeel as a right, and has not been regarded by
the partie·s merely as a privilege, revocable
at the pleasure of the owner of the soil.' ''
Jones on Easements, Sec. 282.'
''The record here shows that the road in
ques'tion was used by the respondent and his predecessors in interest for their own purposes in
farming the land involved. Under such circumstances the general rule is that the use of the road
by another will generally be r~egarded as permissive where such use does not injure or interfe~e
with the owner's use. In 28 C.J.S., Easements,
Sec. 18, p. 668, the rule is stated thus:
'vVhere a landowner opens up a way on
his own land for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by another, under
circumstances which do not injure the road
nor interfere with the owner's use of it, will
not in the absence of circumstances indicating a claim of right be considered as adverse,
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and "'ill not ripen into a prescriptiv~e right
no matter how long continued. Where a S pace
is left open by the owner for his own convenience the presumption ordinarily is that the,
use of such space by anoth~er, even for his
own purpose, is permissive. N evert.heless,
the mere fact that a way has be~en established
by the owner of the land for his own us~e
does not of itself prevent a user of the way
by another from becon1ing adverse, as by
some act or circumstance showing a claim
of an exclusive or peculiar right in claimant distinct from that of the general public.
1

'However, in order to acquire this adverse character knowledge must be brought
home to the owner of the land that the ·uS'er
is claimed as of right. The r~equirement is
not satisfied by keeping the road in repair
for the use of both parties, or by constructing
and maintaining bridges on it. It has also
been held that the m~ere fact that a tenant of
one claiming an eas·ement in a right of way
by adverse user had complained, on one occasion, that poles which had been piled on
the way obstructed it, and that the agent of.
the own~er removed the saine, is not ·evidence
of an assertion of right to use the way sufficient to ripen into title by adverse us~er.' See
supporting authorities cited.

"In Boward v. Wright, 38 Nev. 25, 143 P.
1184, it is said : ' . . . the law in this respect is well
established that where the owner of land opens
a road across it for his own use and keeps it
open f.or his own use, the fact that he sees his
neighbor, or other parties, also making us-~ ·~f it
under circumstances that do not tend to InJure
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the road or interrere that he is yielding to his
express claim of right, or that his neighbor is
asserting any right.'
"To the same ·eff·ect is the case of Anthony
v. K e'YifYI;ard Bldg. C~o., 188 M-o. 704, 87 S.W. 921."
Chief Justice Budge, in Si:mmons v. Perkins, 118 P.
( 2) 740, cites numerous State decisions, including Utah,
in upholding this same doctrine. At p. 744, the Idaho
'Supreme Court says :
''The rule would s~e·em to be that where the
owner of real property constructs a way over it
for his own us~e and convenience, the mere use
thereof by others whic;h in no way interereres with
his use will be pTesumed to be by way of license
or permission. Harkness v. Woodmamsee, 7 Utah
227,2:6 P. 291; How,ar'd v. Wright, 38 Nev. 26,143
P. 1184; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149
N.W. 925; Burk v. Diers, 102 Neb. 721, 169 N.W.
263 ;Long v. MOiJJberry, 96 T~enn. 378, 36 S.W.
1040~ Ra,rish v. Caspar, 109· Ind. 586, 10 N.E. 109;
Null v. Williamson, 16·6 Ind. 537, 78 N.E. 76;
Gascho v. Lewnert, 176 Ind.· 677, 97 N.E. 6; Kilburn v. Adams, Mass., 7 Me'tc. 33, 39 Am. D·ec.
754; 18 C. J. Sec. 120, p. 105; 26 C.J.S., Dedication, s:ec. 19.
''The use of a driveway in common with the
owner and the general public, in the absence of
s-ome decisive act on the user's part indicating a
separate and exclusive use on his part negatives
any presumption of individual right therein in
his favor. Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667, 66 P.
10~ Heenqm v. Bev-ans, 51 Cal. App. 277, 196 P.
802; B'Y"ad~ord v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W.
925; Pirman v. Confer, 273 N. Y. 357, 7 N.E. 2d
26-2, 111 A.L.R. 216. ''
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The soundness of this rule of law bec:omes apparent
in the situation existing here. Respondents' buildings
are leased and occupied by a number of commercial enterprises. The people 'vith whom ~their tenants do business are pern1itted the use of the premises, and the:se
people are unlmown to respondents. In order to keep,
their neighbors from imposing an encumbrance on their
premises, respondents would be required to police all
the entrances thereto, and identify those seeking admittance. This procedure is, obviously, burdensome, and, as
the courts indira te, mitigates against neighborliness, and,
therefore, license or p·ermission is presumed in the absence of actual notice of a claim of right.
If such notice is brought home to the servient owner,
then he can take steps to protect himself, by fencing,
and thereby obstructing access along the p·roperty line
between his land and the land of the person claiming
an easement. No such notice exists in this case. The affirmative evidence is that the respective owners were
friendly and good neighbors.
IV.
ANSWER TO~ PETITIO·N TO STRIKE PORTION
O·F BILL OF EXCEPTIONS
Ap·pellant objects to the proceedings appearing in
Pages 140 to 145 of the Record.
At the conclusion of the case, and on the argument
of the· motion for a new trial, Judge Van Cott expressed
himself to the effect that Mr. Latimer had testified he
had not claimed a right-of-way. No particular objection
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was made in either instanee by counsel for appellant.
The transcript was furnished counsel for respondents, and they were asked to S'tipulate to the effect that
such transcript could he settled as the bill of exceptions.
Upon examination, couns·el discovered that the disputed
testimony did not appear in this transcript, and this fact
was referred to the trial court, which resulted in the supplemental proceedings complained of.
The statutes involved, obviously, require the trial
court to resolve any disputes as to what the bill of excep. .
tions contains. This was done according to the recollection of the court and counsel, in trying ·to correct what
appears to he a mistake of the reporter.
An examination of the procedeings indicats that the
greater part thereof was made at the instanee of appellant, to which he now objects.
It is submitted that no prejudic.e resulted therefrom.
Counsel for appellant had notice of the obj~ections made
by respondents to the settling of the bill, and, if the fact
\\ras otherwise than as express~ed by the court and counsel for respondents, he had an opportunity to bring
Mr. Latimer before the court and resolve the question.
Counsel did not see fit to do this, and is, 'th~erefore, in
no position to compiain.

v.
CO·NCLUSION
Appellant objects to the taxing of costs in the sum
of $13.20 being made in the absence of the s-erving and
filing of a cost bill, as provided by the statute.
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His position in this n1atter appears to be correct,
and respondents have satisfi~e-d this judgment for cost,
together \Yith interest, in the proper manner. No objection \Yas made to this cost item prior to this appeal, and
it can, therefore, be assumed that this n1a:t:t·e-r was not
the primary factor in the appeal. No such claim is made
and. no prejlHlice has resulted.
In the trial of this action, the appellant had the
burden of proving that an eaS'ement was. established by
his us·e of respondents' premises for th·e prescriptive
period. The trial court found that there was a failure- of
proof in this respect.
There is no evidence of adverse use or a claim of
right. Appellant attempts to invoke the rul·e of law that
an established use of the ground for the prescriptive period gives rise to presumptions of advers·e use and a
claim of right. The~e is no evidence of an established
use.
Appellant, in the conclusion of his brief, states :
''The defendant cle-arly showed that he had
an open, continuous and notorious use of their
right . . of-way for a period in excess of forty years,
and that such use gives him a presumption of
adverse use necessary to es~tablish a prescriptive
easement. ' '
How can a use be continuous and notorious, when the
owner, Mr. Latimer, who must sustain such an assertion,
has ne"\Trer in his life s·een respondents' premises so used.
No conte-ntion is, or can be, made that the use claimed is exclusive. Any use made of these premises was in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

common wi~th respondents' us~e. This being the admitted
case, the le:gal presumption arising from this fact is that
such us~e was permissive~, and could never ripen into an
easement.
In view of this circumstance, appellant could not
prevail, ~even though he had proved a sufficient use.
The use, if any, made of 'the premises by appellant
was in common with the owner, and makes unnecessary
a determination of the fact as to wheth·er the us-e was
sufficient to ·establish an easement, which is the ground
of ap·pellant's appeal.
It is submitted that the trial court did not err in
applying the foregoing principles of law to the facts in
this case.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE and MULLINER

.Attorneys for Responde'nts.
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